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INTRODUCTION
This paper considers why and in what 
circumstances small arms are acquired by 
individuals and groups in selected areas of 
the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. 
It reviews the ‘demand’ for small arms – a 
comparatively understudied thematic area of the 
disarmament sector. Demand for small arms is 
shaped by a dynamic combination of motivations 
(e.g. socially and culturally-mediated preferences 
for small arms) and means (e.g. relative monetary 
and non-monetary prices and individual and 
collective resources to acquire them). The 
theoretical moorings of the paper draw from an 
extensive literature review (Muggah and Brauer 
2004), while its empirical foundations emerge 
from fieldwork undertaken in the South Pacific 
in 2004.
Predicting human behaviour in open systems 
is a complex – in some cases unattainable 
– proposition for the social scientist. This is 
especially the case when considering social 
systems (e.g. households, communities, societies 
and states) affected by and emerging from violent 
conflict. An enormous variety of theoretical, 
practical and ethical challenges confront the 
researcher when administering research in such 
environments. However, understanding how the 
demand for firearms is constructed in a particular 
setting – as distinct from the demand for armed 
violence – is essential to the formulation of 
evidence-based and appropriate policy. Greater 
awareness of the complex array and interplay 
of independent variables shaping demand (the 
dependent variable) is integral to the design of 
appropriate interventions to influence attitudes 
and behaviour associated with arms acquisition. 
A considered treatment of motivations and 
means can move the ‘demand’ debate beyond 
narrowly defined and mechanistic interventions. 
The aim of this paper is to review the demand 
of a certain segment of the Solomon Island and 
Papua New Guinean population for small arms 
in the aftermath of periods of intense violence. 
The first section includes a background review 
of the theoretical foundations of the study. A 
selection of methods are reviewed and discussed. 
Section two provides a very general treatment of 
the social norms in the Pacific that potentially 
influence the demand for weapons – including 
demand for firearms. Sections three and four 
include short case studies focusing primarily on 
two comparatively high profile interventions 
that aimed to reduce the ‘demand’ for small 
arms. These were the ‘Weapons Free Village’ 
intervention established by the National Peace 
Council (NPC) in the Solomon Islands and a 
‘Peace Agreement’ brokered by the Catholic 
Church between warring tribes in the Southern 
Highlands of Papua New Guinea. The fifth 
section includes a number of concluding 
reflections on demand in the context of the 
South Pacific.
SECTION 1: THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Demand is constituted by a constellation of 
independent variables – many of which can be 
categorised into what are hereafter referred to as 
‘motivations’ and ‘means’. Motivations include 
the social, cultural and politically constituted 
preferences for firearms. These motivations are 
dynamic and wide-ranging – from a proclivity 
for hunting and sport shooting to a concern with 
personal and collective self-defence, the pursuit 
of social status and even predatory behaviour. 
Means refer primarily to the relative price of 
obtaining firearms and the relative resources and 
assets available to purchase, rent, steal or borrow 
them. Motivations and means are seldom either/
or but are rather both/and. In other words, there 
are often manifold and overlapping motivations 
for seeking particular weapons and a constantly 
shifting set of means that constrain or facilitate 
their acquisition.
The motivations and means approach can 
potentially account for the demand for particular 
weapons types – from craft or homemade 
firearms to light machine guns and artillery. The 
acquisition of a specific type of weapon – say a 
handgun or a rocket-propelled grenade launcher 
– will be shaped by clusters of motivation of 
the purchaser (e.g. crime in the case of the 
concealable pistol and offensive military use 
in the case of the RPG) and, importantly the 
weapons relative price (e.g. cost, accessibility and 
punishments associated with acquisition, etc.) and 
assets at their disposal (e.g. cash, other tradable 
commodity, social capital, etc.). For example, 
the relative price of a handgun is generally low 
– not only are they comparatively inexpensive in 
relation to automatic rifles, they are concealable 
(and therefore hidden from police or potential 
victims) and can often be easily accessed with 
limited resources (whether through retail outlets 
or on the black market). In most cases, the price 
of an RPG tends to be somewhat higher – they 
are rather more expensive, are more visible 
and, with the exception of situations of state 
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where Peace Agreements had been developed in 
‘tribal areas’ of the Southern Highlands. A range 
of tools were adopted for the study, including 
participatory research with ex-militants, a small-
scale demand survey administered to convicted 
militants serving sentences in the Solomon Islands 
and a purposive survey carried out with ‘tribal 
fighters’ in Papua New Guinea. Accompanying 
the entire process were site visits to validate 
information and key informant interviews with 
a selection of senior bureaucrats, military and 
civilian police and international peacekeeping 
forces, non-governmental agencies and faith-
based organisations, women’s associations and 
community-based organisations, academics, 
as well as mining and security consultants, 
epidemiologists and public health specialists and 
others.
SECTION 2. REFLECTIONS ON 
SOCIAL NORMS IN THE PACIFIC
Though often aggregated together, the 
nations, states and communities of the Pacific 
exhibit a high degree of socio-cultural complexity 
and diversity. While clustered into Melanesian, 
Polynesian and Micronesian ethnic groups, 
these groupings mask a considerable level of 
fluidity between categories. For example, largely 
Melanesian Papua New Guinea, a country with a 
population of just over five million, registers over 
800 distinct languages and literally thousands 
of sub-dialects within a highly dispersed and 
ethnically diverse population. The Solomon 
Islands, also Melanesian, is home to some 87 
languages and literally hundreds of dialects 
among a comparatively small population of 
409,000 people (1999 census). Between 80 and 
85 per cent of the PNG and Solomon Islands’ 
populations live in rural areas and these two 
countries register among the highest population 
growth rates in the world. The separate regions 
and islands that make up each country are 
themselves inhabited by a complex mixture 
of matrilineal and patriarchal societies and an 
innumerable array of inter-ethnic and inter-tribal 
marriage and customary compacts. It is difficult 
if not erroneous, to speak of stable, fixed or 
homogeneous identities in the Pacific.
Individual and collective identity in PNG 
and the Solomon Islands is largely porous and 
overlapping. Though a gross simplification, 
identities can be seen as radiating in concentric 
circles outwards from blood lineage (e.g. the 
family unit and the clan) to those of a common 
sub-tribe and tribe. The tightest identity unit 
collapse or intense conflict, more difficult to 
source. Ultimately, the motivations and means 
framework offers a novel approach to appraising 
‘demand’ for firearms in the Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea.
The ‘demand’ for small arms has hitherto 
been explained largely in rational utility terms. 
In this view, arms acquisition is a direct and 
explicit response to fulfilling an individually 
determined  and time-specific function – whether 
in pursuit of a particular political agenda, as a 
rent-seeking opportunity, protection of self and 
family, or some other readily identifiable and 
individuated interest. In this view, demand is a 
consequence of rational self-interest – for self-
defence, predatory activities, recreation or some 
other preference. Arms acquisition – from low 
calibre rifles (0.22) to light machine guns (M60) 
– fulfil a purpose for the potential holder. Demand 
is therefore individually rather than collectively 
determined and it can be rationally disaggregated 
into constituent either/or variables.
This paper intends to broaden the current 
approach to demand-related research on small 
arms. At the outset, it advocates a shift from 
deterministic and mechanistic understandings of 
human behaviour to one that embraces plurality 
and multiplicity of perspectives and possibilities. 
There is no singular or ultimately true motive 
or preference for gun acquisition. Rather, the 
motivation and means to acquire guns are hugely 
diverse and interconnected, and can only be 
understood, if at all, in specific contexts or in 
situ. Similarly, a preference for handguns can be 
conditioned by manifold factors – including a 
desired social status (guns as symbol of virility, 
masculinity), as a means of self-defence and also 
for the purpose of successfully pursuing rents 
– illegal or otherwise. Moreover, demand for a 
particular weapon can change over time – from 
otherwise legitimate to illegitimate purposes. 
It is important to recognise at the outset the 
considerable limitations of isolating segments of 
a situation and analysing them independently. 
Rather, a more holistic and contingent appraisal 
is necessary.
The field research adopted in this study 
drew on a grounded, comparative and multi-
method approach. Each of the research tools 
and instruments were designed iteratively, and 
following an initial round of intensive interviews, 
focus groups and pilot testing in the Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea. The primary 
approach entailed participatory focus group 
assessments with trained local researchers in more 
than ten communities: particularly ‘weapons free 
villages’ in Guadalcanal and Malaita and sites 
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is tied to genealogical networks – and can span 
several generations. Binding together those of a 
blood and tribal affiliations is a common language. 
Unsurprisingly, ‘civic’ and ‘national’ identities 
are widely perceived as the most remote of all 
identities. Identities are also strongly correlated 
with one’s matrilineal or patriarchal descent, and 
thus highly correlated with particular culture 
groups.
The concepts of nationhood and the 
consolidation of the institutions of the state 
are nascent in PNG and the Solomon Islands, 
much less the Pacific. Due to the comparatively 
recent colonisation and independence of PNG 
(1975) and the Solomon Islands (1978), notions 
of a national and civic identity have been 
slow to materialise. There is no tradition of 
overarching governance, and clans and clan 
sections had headmen who were repositories of 
clan history and led groups in feuding, ritual and 
warfare. The apparatus of the state appears to be 
regarded more as a resource to be exploited for 
the benefit of tribe and clan than for advancing 
otherwise ‘progressive’ economic and social 
development. Though coming increasingly under 
external pressure, domestic trade and commerce, 
the administration of justice and retribution, 
marriage rites and the management of conflict 
continue to be regulated in large part by customary 
mechanisms. This is in fact typical of traditional 
stateless and so-called pre-modern societies – 
where injunctions are rarely encoded in a formal 
corpus juris (Goldman 2003). Rather, norms are 
informally expressed through figurative genres 
of proverb or adage. This is not to suggest that 
such rules are weakly held, applied or understood 
– even if connoted as such by outsiders.
Conflict in the Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands, as in most other countries, has 
and will continue to be a normal feature of daily 
existence (Fitzpatrick 1982). Indigenous conflict 
systems have in fact been described as embracing 
a ‘cultural logic’, with fighting constituting a 
sequenced set of behavioural responses that itself 
constitutes a coda or precipitate closure. As noted 
by Goldman (2003: 1): “the idea of a ‘community’ 
without conflict may be an objective that is 
neither socially imaginable nor even desired”. 
Indeed, social equilibrium predicated on cyclical 
patterns of grievance management is natural – 
and conflict and conflict resolution characterise 
all social organisations irrespective of their locale 
or level of development. But violent conflict can 
often throw conflict management strategies out of 
kilter. In Papua New Guinea, and more recently 
the Solomon Islands, violent symptoms of conflict 
are a comparatively recent development. The 
introduction of domestic sourced high-powered 
firearms has undeniably contributed to the scale 
and distribution of armed violence. Contrary to 
conventional belief, however, firearms have been 
in the region for over a century. 
A growing literature on the complex systems 
of ‘compensation’ and ‘payback’ has emerged in 
the past decades (Glasse 1959; Strathern 1977). 
According to Goldman (2003: 3): “the logic of 
revenge and redress, the payback system, the 
cycle of killing and counter killing that can 
ramify from any breach of rights may appear 
indiscriminate”. But as he notes, “this would be 
to ignore the calculus of segementary descent 
principles whereby the named clan section that 
owned a fight was held corporately responsible 
for the actions of its members”. Any descent unit 
member, kin or affine, could become a legitimate 
target for retributive homicides. The motivations 
guiding such actions were determined by: (1) a 
belief that the spirit of the slain person would 
visit sickness on relatives who did not avenge 
his death; (2) the anger of relatives against 
a fight ‘owner’ who did not both avenge and 
compensate the death of an ally; (3) descent unit 
pride at war prowess; and (4) the need to avoid 
public opprobrium and shame. Such opaque 
motivations allowed for multiple ‘readings’ of 
deaths depending on the social circumstances of 
the reader (Ibid).
It should be emphasised that ‘motivations’ 
for small arms acquisition are not necessarily 
individually determined. Western interpretations 
of ‘demand’ tend to envision individuals in a 
particular society as ‘bound agents’ – a world 
of atomised, self-interested and frequently 
conflicting actors. When considering the 
demand for small arms in Papua New Guinea 
and the Solomon Islands, what may appear at 
first to be driven by self-interest are often heavily 
influenced by tribal, clan, household and familial 
affiliations and corporate interests. Demand is 
greatly facilitated by kinship and tribal affiliations. 
Put another way, the preference for weapons, the 
price of firearms and their acquisition, and the 
resources available to purchase them is strongly 
related to the predominant social networks in 
society. The relative influence and importance 
attached to kinship and tribal affiliations must 
be adequately recognised in any consideration 
of demand reduction initiatives. As this paper 
will make clear, deterrence-based strategies that 
focus on penalising and raising the price of 
firearms for individuals may only be partially 
successful. Approaches advancing normative 
compliance, that build on values, norms and 
attitudes prevalent in Pacific society should 
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also be considered. Penalties could be adjusted 
to accommodate these, equally legitimate, 
customary regulatory systems. 
SECTION 3. WEAPONS FREE 
VILLAGES IN THE SOLOMON 
ISLANDS
The Solomon Islands is recovering from a 
period of armed violence that erupted in the late 
1990s. Although a peace agreement was signed in 
2000 between the two principle militant factions 
– the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and the 
Malaita Eagle Front (MEF) – and an International 
Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) set-up to 
monitor its terms, the law and order situation 
continued to deteriorate. Under the auspices of 
the Pacific Island Forum’s Biketawa Declaration 
and following its authorisation by the Solomon 
Islands Parliament, members of a 2,250-member 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) arrived in Honiara during the last week 
of July 2003. While Operation Helpem Fren began 
with an 18-month mandate, RAMSI was first 
and foremost a policing operation. Its principal 
objective was to establish security in Honiara 
in order to enable government, business and 
community to operate free of armed intimidation. 
Improved security was rapidly extended beyond 
Honiara by the end of 2003. The collection of 
illegal weapons constituted a major priority in 
the early stages of the intervention.
The recent ‘conflict’ in the Solomon Islands 
has been popularly interpreted as one between 
two distinct ethnic groups –Malaitans and 
Guadalcanalese (see GoS 2003; UNDP 2004). 
As with other internal conflicts around the world, 
the reality is more complex. Land scarcity and the 
progressive encroachment of Malaitan settlers on 
the island of Guadalcanal represented a central 
factor contributing to the onset of conflict. 
A range of indigenous grievances, including 
perceptions of the dominance of Malaitans in 
the civil service and Royal Solomon Island Police 
(RSIP), contributed to the outbreak of violent 
conflict. The conflict resulted in the intentional 
deaths of an estimated 150-200 individuals, as well 
as approximately 430-460 non-fatal small arms 
related injuries. At the height of the ‘tensions’, 
more than 35,000 Solomon Islanders were 
displaced from their homes in rural Guadalcanal. 
Table 1 highlights the distribution and types 
of reported injuries associated with high and 
low-powered small arms (see also Annex 1). 
More than 3,500 weapons – including high-
powered weapons stolen from police armories 
and homemade guns– were believed to be in 
circulation in mid-2003 (Muggah 2003). While 
key foreign investment sectors were affected, 
including mining and copra plantations, the 
informal sector was not hugely affected.
The primary mechanism for collecting weapons 
in the Solomon’s since the 2000 Townsville Peace 
Agreement (TPA) were amnesties. Both the 
Solomon Island Government and the RAMSI 
forces introduced short-term amnesties to collect 
illegal manufactured and homemade weapons. 
Table 1. Frequency of Small Arm and Laceration Injuries at the National Referral Hospital, 
Honiara, 1994-2002
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The record of amnesties prior to the arrival of 
RAMSI was mixed. Deficiencies of amnesty-
related legislation and enforcement processes 
included their reliance on ‘compensation’ to 
aggrieved parties. In practice, the injection of 
new resources served to fuel demand for still more 
weapons. Pre-RAMSI amnesties  failed to bring 
in ‘high powered weapons’, and succeeded more 
in collecting less desirable homemade firearms. 
Due to failures in effectively communicating 
the objectives of the amnesties, the symbolic 
dividends in terms of promoting a ‘gun free’ 
Solomon Islands were not realized. By contrast, 
the amnesty introduced after the deployment of 
RAMSI resulted in the surrender of some 3,730 
weapons by the end of the August 2003. This 
amounted to an estimated 90-95 per cent of 
the country’s stockpile (Nelson 2004). RAMSI 
introduced an extremely powerful and enforceable 
deterrent: anyone found with a weapon could 
expect to serve a prison sentence of up to 10 years 
or pay a USD 3,500 dollar fine. With RAMSI’s 
arrival, the relative price of weapons possession 
rose steeply.
There are a number of reasons why weapons 
collection has been markedly more successful since 
the deployment of RAMSI. The overwhelming 
deterrence that RAMSI represents is an obvious 
one. Less obvious is the role of the National 
Peace Council (NPC) in fostering bottom-
up and normative approaches to reducing the 
preferences for firearms and raising their ‘social’ 
price. The NPC was established by the Solomon 
Islands government in October 2002 to continue 
implementing reconciliation-oriented activities 
and initiate new interventions to advance 
the peace process. Its membership comprises 
government representatives, former MEF and 
IFM militia, and the provincial governments of 
Guadalcanal and Malaita. The NPC operates 
as a neutral body in a similar fashion to its 
predecessor, the Peace Monitoring Council. Its 
initial mandate is for three years subject to 
annual budgetary processes and appropriations. 
The primary activities of the NPC include 
the ‘Weapons Free Village’ (WFV) campaign. 
The WFV initiative encourages communities 
to voluntarily achieve ‘weapons-free status’ 
through a formal certification process with the 
assistance of NPC monitors. It provides a degree 
of recognition and incentive (e.g. the donation 
of sporting equipment) to those villages that 
are certified as having acquired  ‘weapons free’ 
status. Approximately eighty NPC monitors 
assess weapons availability in a given area and 
strive to ensure that no guns remain prior to a 
village being certified as ‘weapons free’. During 
certification ceremonies chiefs and village leaders 
sign a weapons free declaration. Certification 
requires sanctioning from the government. 
Since its inception in August 2002, more than 
974 villageshave been declared weapons free in 
public ceremonies (see Table 2). This amounts 
to more than three quarters of the set target of 
1,200 villages by December 2004. The record of 
weapons collection by NPC has been generally 
under-appreciated. While a mere 22 weapons 
were returned to the NPC prior to RAMSI, 
approximately fifty per cent of all 3,730 weapons 
collected since RAMSI’s arrival are alleged to 
have been provided to NPC representatives first 
before being handed over to RAMSI personnel. 
The activities of the WFV program are 
clustered into twelve separate regions on the 
islands of Guadalcanal and Malaita. Each region 
consists of a cluster of wards registering between 
20 and 50 villages each. A village is typically 
composed of a minimum of 10 households, 
though it can be larger, and is categorsied as 
such for purely budgetary reasons. ‘Villages’ 
declared ‘weapons free’ may not conform to their 
original (administrative) designation prior to the 
launch of the program. The weapons free villages 
scheme operates through the NPC, with team 
leaders and regional monitors visiting village 
chiefs and arranging for certification, as well 
as verifying villages that have not yet achieved 
status and collecting surrendered weapons for 
Table 2. Weapons Free Village Data for Malaita and Guadalcanal from Jan-Dec 2003
Guadalcanal Malaita
January 104 220
February 70 90
March 41 91
April 17 55
May 23 5
June 7 50
July to December 108 93
Total 370 (38%) 604 (62%)
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the IFM tended to produce their own weapons 
from galvanised water pipes and assorted springs 
(e.g. from umbrellas, sewing machines, etc). 
For the MEF, the majority of manufactured 
weapons were sourced from the Rove armoury in 
Honiara and the Auki police station in Malaita. 
They had little need for externally sourced or 
smuggled weapons. For the comparatively less 
well armed IFM, the majority of military-style 
weapons were acquired through exchanges for 
clothes, retail commodities and other goods in 
Western Province, presumabely through contacts 
with former combatants from the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA). 
The motivations for acquiring and possessing 
specific types of high-powered weapons ranged 
from protection to hunting and appeared the 
same for both MEF and IFM militia. According 
to a variety of sources, remaining high-powered 
weapons are cached in the Weather Coast of 
Guadalcanal and North and Eastern Malaita, 
areas with strong IFM and MEF associations. 
An important  reason for continuing demand 
among communities living in Weapons Free 
Villages relates to hunting and pest control. 
Concerns were registered in both Malaitan and 
Guadalcanal communities related to the growing 
incidence of attacks by crocodiles on locals 
and the destructive impacts of wild pigs on 
subsistence and cash crops. Though RAMSI has 
offered a service to undertake pest-control, a 
number of respondents claimed that they would 
acquire a .22 and .303 calibre rifles for hunting 
purposes and self-protection.
The price of weapons also appeared to fluctuate 
over the course of the tensions. For example, 
prices for commercially manufactured firearms 
ranged from SI5,000 (USD 660) to 10,000 (USD 
1,320) during the height of the ‘tensions’ as 
compared to approximately SI1,000 (USD 130) 
prior to the outbreak of tensions. With the 
arrival of RAMSI in July 2003, the relative price 
of weapons acquisition increased dramatically. 
Key informants reveal that the public display 
of manufactured and craft-produced weapons 
reduced precipitously. Though the monetary cost 
of weapons temporarily fell after the arrival of 
RAMSI, it is widely believed that a number of 
remaining high-powered weapons are still cached 
by small groups of former militia.
While demand for firearms appears to 
be negatively correlated with high levels of 
punitive deterrence, it also appears that social 
pressures applied by communities on militants are 
influential in curbing demand. Indeed, by raising 
the relative ‘social cost’ of weapons acquisition 
and ownership in particular villages, the WFVs 
handover to RAMSI. The NPC also hold ward-
wide ceremonies and transfer the incentive 
(eg. sporting equipment) on completion of the 
ceremony.
DEMAND IN THE WEAPONS FREE 
VILLAGES
A Small Arms Survey team sought to appraise 
the short to medium-term effects of the Weapons 
Free Village program, focusing primarily on 
process and impact indicators (Nelson 2004). The 
evaluation also devoted considerable attention to 
identifying and analysing factors contributing to 
the acquisition of firearms in the period before 
and after the arrival of RAMSI. 
Though inter-communal conflict does not 
appear to be as deeply embedded in the Solomon 
Islands as in neighbouring PNG, significant 
tensions over land resources persist. As a result, 
a considerable number of residents are strongly 
in favour of the continued presence of RAMSI. 
There is a belief that the outbreak of violence 
is still possible in parts of the Solomon Islands 
given adequate means. While the motivations 
(e.g. preference for small arms acquisition) 
continue, albeit at lower levels than prior to 
the arrival of RAMSI, the means (e.g. price of 
acquisition) has increased considerably. The high 
cost of weapons possession, both in terms of the 
presence of RAMSI and the deterrent effects 
of recently introduced penalties, has increased 
the relative price of firearms. However, relative 
resources have also increased since the return 
of investment and stability. As a result, firearms 
acquisition could increase if RAMSI were to 
depart in the near future.
The field research indicated that awareness 
of types and calibres of weapons was relatively 
high among both ex-militants and the broader 
community. Participatory focus group sessions 
with randomly selected community residents 
and former militants living in WFVs in Malaita 
demonstrated knowledge of more than ten 
different types of firearms. For those living in 
WFV’s in Guadalcanal, awareness of firearms 
types and calibres was less developed. The high 
level of awareness, particularly in Malaita, is 
surprising given the recent introduction of 
commercial and military-style weapons to the 
civilian population of the Solomon Islands. 
Both militia groups claimed distinct command 
and control structures in relation to small arm 
acquisition and holdings. Participatory research 
suggested that the MEF distributed manufactured 
weapons on an ad hoc but needs-basis, while 
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encouraged the voluntary surrender of weapons 
to the NPC and deterred further demand. Put 
another way, by stigmatising gun ownership, 
firearm ownership incurred a community penalty. 
As noted above, up to 50 per cent of the 
3,740 collected by RAMSI by August 2003 were 
believed returned to NPC monitors as part of 
local surrender initiatives.
Key entry-points identified by the communities 
in Malaita and Guadalcanal to ‘reduce’ demand 
related to the increased investment in law and 
order.  This had the effect of both reducing the 
latent ‘preference’ for small arms and raising 
the cost or price associated with acquisition. 
Virtually all respondents felt that deliberate 
and targeted investments (monetary and non-
monetary) and support for employment of male 
youth would similarly reduce ‘preferences’. There 
nevertheless remains the possibility that this 
could also potentially increase relative resources, 
thereby triggering more demand. The harnessing 
of women’s groups was also seen as a constructive 
investment in influencing both preferences and 
the relative price of weapons. Though women 
appeared to register a comparatively ambivalent 
attitude toward small arms acquisition, women’s 
groups were extremely active in reducing armed 
violence and calling for reductions in weapons 
possession during the height of the ‘tensions’. 
In other words, women’s groups stigmatised 
weapons possession and raised the cost, to men 
in particular, of acquiring them. 
SECTION 4: PEACE AGREEMENTS IN 
THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS OF PNG
Papua New Guinea has suffered from rising 
levels of insecurity since independence in 1975. 
Despite comparatively high levels of overseas 
development assistance to improving policing and 
safety, the situation has continued to deteriorate 
in many areas. The most dramatic instance of 
low-intensity conflict was the nine-year civil 
war on the island of Bougainville. PNG is now 
widely perceived as a haven for criminal and 
tribal violence. The towns of Port Moresby and 
Lae, as well as the Southern Highlands and Enga 
provinces, are regarded as especially volatile. 
Studies have identified a wide variety of forms 
from domestic and sexual violence to acute levels 
of armed criminality (eg. ‘raskols‘ gangs) and 
tribal conflicts (Dinnen and Thompson 2004). 
Small arms are a relatively recent 
phenomenon in PNG and most appear to be 
sourced domestically from the PNG defence 
force , police and unscrupulous political leaders 
(Alpers and Muggah 2004). The Southern 
Highlands province has been the location of 
chronic levels of violent armed conflict in recent 
years  with remarkably high  rates of firearm and 
knife-related violence (see Table 3 and Annex 
1). In the absence of effective government or 
policing responses, a number of local peace-
making initiatives involving women’s groups, 
churches, and development agencies, have 
quietly emerged.
More than twenty-two sub-regions of the 
Southern Highlands have experienced severe 
outbreaks of armed violence since 1989. The 
use of commercially manufactured weapons first 
became apparent in the early 1990s (Alpers 
and Muggah 2004). An especially severe armed 
conflict erupted between the two tribes bordering 
the provincial capital, Mendi. The Ujamap and 
Wogia tribes, made up of a collection of clans 
and sub-clans, began a major conflict in 1998 
resulting in an estimated 120 intentional firearm 
deaths by 2002. Public services crumbled as the 
violence escalated. The referral hospital closed 
for six months in early 2002 and numerous 
clinics, schools, transport nodes and government 
offices were also shut down.
Table 3. Percentage Gunshot and Knife Injuries as a Proportion of All Admissions at Mendi 
Hospital: 1998-2004
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Though popularly perceived as an extremely 
heavily armed society, there are in fact relatively 
few commercially manufactured weapons in 
the Southern Highlands. A recent Small Arms 
Survey study suggests that there may be less than 
2,000 in the entire province (Alpers 2004). The 
low number of units can be attributed to their 
comparatively high price and the scarcity of 
ammunition. There is, however, a considerable 
diversity of weapons available and prices range 
from the equivalent of K2,000  (USD630) for 
a pistol to K24,000 (USD 7,550) for an M60. 
Common semi-automatic assault rifles are valued 
at some K5,000 – 8,000 (USD1,575- USD2,520), 
though prices appear to vary considerably. Though 
homemade guns are common, M16 assault rifles, 
pump action rifles, self-loading rifles and pistols 
were reportedly widespread and highly prized. 
Armed violence around the capital of the 
Southern Highlands, Mendi, peaked between 
2001 and 2002.  Concentrated primarily between 
the Wogia and Unjamap tribes, an estimated 120 
tribesmen and women were shot and killed, and 
hundreds more intentionally injured (see table 
3 above). Despite repeated pleas to government 
authorities from representatives of civil society, 
the situation became progressively worse. In 2001 
and 2002, a number of faith based organisations 
sought to broker a Peace Agreement between 
the two warring tribes. The ’Mendi Peace 
Commission‘ was chaired by a local businessman, 
along with the bishops of both the Catholic and 
United churches of Mendi. With limited support 
from government, these three community leaders 
spent months brokering a ’Peace Agreement‘ 
which, when signed on May 3, 2002, offered 
closure to a three-year tribal war.
A transparent process of reconciliation was 
organised to cement the Peace Agreement. The 
key parties to the fighting – the Urum tribe of 
Unjamap village and the Tungujup tribe of Wogia 
village – publicly acknowledged the harm done by 
their actions and offered unreserved expressions 
of sorrow and apology to all those affected. 
Both tribes sought forgiveness and reconciliation, 
and repeated their vows to cease all hostilities, 
allow freedom of movement, and to respect each 
other’s tribal boundaries. Commitments were 
also made to ’dismiss‘ mercenary gunmen, entrust 
all firearms to the control of tribal leaders, cease 
the public display of offensive weapons, and 
to cooperate with police in clamping down on 
alcohol and marijuana abuse which were seen as 
key catalysts for driving ’preferences‘ for weapons. 
Stolen property was returned and mediation 
was set in motion to negotiate reparations and 
forgiveness. More than two years after its signing 
at a public ceremony attended by more than 
10,000 people, the Mendi Peace Agreement has 
held without any major breach.
DEMAND IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
THE PEACE AGREEMENT
As in Solomon Islands, conflict lays a 
regulating function in the daily life of Southern 
Highlanders. Tribal fighting has been an integral 
part of the historical experience of local societies. 
Conflict constitutes a deep preference among 
tribes in the region. A core indicator of ’victory‘ 
appears to be the number of deaths inflicted 
on the opponent as compared to the number 
sustained by one’s native tribe. The introduction 
of military-style weapons has dramatically 
increased the number of deaths and consequent 
retributive killings on all sides. 
As in Solomon Islands, community members 
and tribal fighters in the Southern Highlands 
demonstrated a considerable awareness of the 
various types of high-powered weapons in 
circulation. Unjamap and Wogia tribes identified 
between 18 and 23 distinct types of small arms 
and light weapons used in conflicts and paybacks 
over the past decade. Though the precise 
identification of specific brands and calibres were 
occasionally confused, respondents showed a high 
level of insight into the technical and practical 
maintenance of manufactured firearms. A strong 
preference for manufactured and homemade small 
arms has taken hold despite their comparatively 
recent introduction and low availability.
Research revealed a similarly wide variety 
of categories of weapons holders – from police, 
correctional facilities, and PNGDF to ’politicians‘, 
’raskols‘, ’tribal shooters‘ and ‘mercenaries’. Those 
believed to possess the most varied types of 
weapons – from bush knives to M60 light machine 
guns – were the tribal fighters themselves. A 
structured and purposive survey of ’tribal fighters‘ 
indicated that the motivation (preference) for 
manufactured weapons was persistent. Protection 
and payback are key motivations although it 
is clear that there are likely to be multiple and 
competing motivations underlying acquisition. 
Specific types of weapons were preferred. Over 
seventy per cent of respondents favoured M16s, 
though for others, SLR, shotguns and pistols were 
the weapons of choice. More than seventy-four 
per cent of respondents claim that it is ‘fine’ or 
‘always fine’ to own a weapon. 
Due to the persistence of tribal conflict and 
a vigorous culture of exchange, the demand 
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for weapons (e.g. motivation and means) is 
high. As in many parts of the PNG Highlands, 
tribal conflict is an endemic feature of Southern 
Highlands. Unlike homicides and other forms of 
violence where compensation can be arranged, 
there are no clear mechanisms to permanently 
end tribal conflicts. Rather, these are systematic 
and their outbreaks can only be reduced through 
reconciliation and other processes. It appears that 
while the real price of weapons remains high, 
Southern Highlanders are able to acquire weapons 
by using a variety of forms of asset exchange. 
Key informants highlighted the prevalence of 
collective acquisition by communities – whether 
through barter trade (e.g. livestock, women, etc), 
credit, or other assets. Alternatively, community 
representatives would rent weapons, or owners 
of weapons as mercenaries, to pursue conflict. 
Survey findings suggested that over sixty per cent 
of informants would buy guns if they could, while 
a third would either buy or borrow.
There are, however, a number of entry-points 
in the Southern Highlands to potentially reduce 
the demand for weapons. Ways of mitigating 
demand focused on reconstruction of small-scale 
clinics, schools and road infrastructure that could 
revitalise community development and address 
the ’deep preference’ for conflict. Communities 
highlighted the importance of collective 
incentives to reduce gun acquisition – akin to 
a ’weapons for development‘ intervention. As 
long as tribal tensions persist, the preference for 
weapons, whether for self-defence or protection, 
will remain. Episodic violent outbreaks can 
nevertheless be mitigated with interventions 
designed to (i) reduce weapons availability, (ii) 
strengthen the credibility, capacity and reach 
of the policing and justice sectors, (iii) curb 
corruption and strengthen accountability among 
local and district-level political representatives, 
and (iv) ensure an equitable investment in 
social and economic infrastructure in key 
flashpoint communities throughout the Southern 
Highlands.
SECTION 5: CONCLUDING 
REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS
Disarmament is a long-term, even permanent, 
exercise. To be truly effective it must influence 
both motivations – including attitudinal and 
behavioural preferences for weapons – as well as 
raise the real and relative price of acquisition and 
ownership. Conventional approaches to arms 
control tend to focus primarily on increasing the 
relative price of weapons – through either increased 
military and police presence or the introduction 
and enforcement of penalties. More recently, 
interventions inspired by the development sector 
seek to increase the relative resources and assets 
of potential users so as to provide incentives and 
’alternatives‘ to weapons acquisition and retention 
and, by implication, predatory behaviour. To be 
successful, disarmament must endorse a more 
multifaceted agenda – one that addresses demand 
reduction alongside with arms reduction. As this 
paper argues, demand reduction encompasses 
three key factors – preferences, relative prices 
and relative resources. A number of instructive 
lessons associated with demand reduction emerge 
from the two cases studies. 
As evidenced in the case of the Solomon 
Islands, the introduction of a military-backed 
intervention force – together with its largely 
deterrence-based approach (e.g. amnesties, 
penalties, enforcement, convictions) – offers a 
compelling approach to reducing demand in the 
short-term.  The overwhelming threat of penalties 
and the capacity to enforce them resulted in 
a rapid de-escalation in weapons availability, 
an unprecedented increase in ’security‘ and a 
reduced incentive on the part of either Malaitan 
or Guadel community members and militants to 
acquire firearms. The presence of a legitimate or 
respected deterrent was not similarly present in 
the case of the Papua New Guinea’s Southern 
Highlands. Thus, the relative price of weapons 
– while still high – could not be raised higher 
still. In the absence of a strong security presence, 
local actors developed alternative approaches 
and seeking to engender an approach based on 
normative compliance. 
Externally driven intervention efforts in both 
the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 
– whether peacekeeping forces, amnesties or 
’weapons for development‘ programmes, could 
benefit tremendously by inculcating local 
ownership of disarmament efforts. Local buy-
in can be ensured through the harnessing of 
customary mechanisms and high profile efforts 
to raise the benefits - and reduce the relative 
price - of disarming and stigmatising (raising 
the relative price of) weapons ownership. The 
‘Weapons Free Village’, while imperfect, offers 
a template that could be used in comparable 
circumstances. The Peace Agreement signed 
in the Southern Highlands drew explicitly on 
customary mechanisms and appropriate norms 
to instil confidence in, admittedly temporary, 
stability and to disarm warring belligerents. 
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ANNEX 1 INJURIES IN SOLOMON ISLANDS AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Reported Firearm Injuries in the Solomon Islands: 1994-2002
National Referral Hospital: Types of injuries Sustained by Small Arms: 1997-2002
Chest Extremity Pelvis, Abdomen or Spine Head Other
1994 2 12 2 0 0
1995 0 1 0 0 0
1996 2 20 1 1 0
1997 0 5 0 2 0
1998 3 3 1 1 0
1999 11 33 7 16 3
2000 13 45 8 17 4
2001 8 19 2 17 0
2002 0 12 5 0 1
2003 150-180
High Velocity includes M-16, Police-issue SL88 and pistols
Low Velocity includes Shotguns, .22 rifles and homemade weapons
Table. Proﬁle of Reported Gunshot Victims at Mendi Hospital: 1998-2002
Male Female Total Admissions of All Types Percent Gunshot
1998 24 0 422 5
1999 9 1 449 3
2000 11 0 414 3
2001 23 0 457 5
2002 5 2 128 5
2003 4 0 416 1
2004 5 0 116 4
Total 81 3 2402 3.5
*1998 beginning in April only
** Mendi Hospital closed for January to September 2002 and only semi-operational thereafter
***2004 includes January to mid-May only
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